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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE1 
Amici Curiae are 109 immigration law professors, all of whom have 
substantial expertise and interest in the proper interpretation and enforcement of 
the immigration laws.  Amici have, collectively, more than 1,500 years of 
experience in immigration law, and many have participated in congressional and 
national discussion about the administrative actions at issue in this litigation.  See, 
e.g., Written Testimony of Stephen H. Legomsky before the United States House 
of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary (Feb. 25, 2015), 
https://lofgren.house.gov/uploadedfiles/legomsky_testimony.pdf (“Legomsky 
Testimony”); Open Letter by Scholars and Teachers of Immigration Law (Mar. 13, 
2015), https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/_file/LAWPROFLTRHANENFINAL.pdf ; 
Open Letter by Scholars and Teachers of Immigration Law (Nov. 25, 2014), 
https://pennstatelaw.psu.edu/sites/default/files/documents/pdfs/Immigrants/executi
ve-action-law-prof-letter.pdf.  Amici believe they can, in light of their knowledge 
and experience, offer the Court valuable perspectives on the issues raised by this 
case.  A full list of amici appears in the Appendix. 
                                           
1 No counsel for a party authored this brief in whole or in part, and no such counsel or party 
made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or submission of this brief.  No 
person other than the amici curiae and their counsel made such a monetary contribution.  The 
parties have consented to the filing of this amicus curiae brief.   
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INTRODUCTION 
Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and Lawful Permanent Residents 
(“DAPA”) and expansion of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) 
are well within the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security’s (the 
“Secretary”) express statutory authority to establish national immigration-
enforcement policies and priorities as well as the Secretary’s broad discretion in 
enforcing United States immigration laws.  DAPA and expanded DACA are based 
on considerations peculiarly within the Secretary’s expertise; are not inconsistent 
with congressional policies underlying immigration-law statutes; follow 
longstanding administrative practices that Congress has never prohibited or 
restricted; constitute considered priority-setting and exercises of prosecutorial 
discretion, not abdication of the Secretary’s responsibilities; and, while providing 
general criteria for deferred-action decisions, require the exercise of enforcement 
discretion on a case-by-case basis.  The district court’s findings to the contrary 
should be rejected, and its grant of a preliminary injunction should be reversed.  
ARGUMENT 
I. The Secretary Has Broad Discretion in Enforcing Immigration Laws   
A federal executive agency typically has “absolute discretion” to decide 
whether a violation of the law it administers warrants an enforcement action.  
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985).  This discretion arises from the fact 
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that, given limited resources, “[a]n agency generally cannot act against each 
technical violation of the statute it is charged with enforcing.”  Id.  Decisions not to 
pursue an enforcement action thus involve “a complicated balancing” of factors 
“peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise.”  Id.  After identifying a violation of 
law, agencies must balance “whether agency resources are best spent on this 
violation or another, whether the agency is likely to succeed if it acts, whether the 
particular enforcement action requested best fits the agency’s overall policies, and, 
indeed, whether the agency has enough resources to undertake the action at all.”  
Id.  Because an agency is “far better equipped than the courts to deal with the many 
variables involved in the proper ordering of its priorities,” judicial review of non-
enforcement decisions is presumptively unavailable.  Id. at 831-32.  In Chaney, the 
Supreme Court likened agency non-enforcement decisions to “the decision of a 
prosecutor in the Executive Branch not to indict—a decision which has long been 
regarded as the special province of the Executive Branch.”  Id. at 832.  
This rule has special relevance for federal immigration policy, particularly 
with respect to removal decisions and deferred action.  See Office of Legal 
Counsel, The Department of Homeland Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal 
of Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of 
Others 4 (Nov. 19, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/
attachments/2014/11/20/2014-11-19-auth-prioritize-removal.pdf (“OLC Op.”).  By 
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statute, the Secretary is “responsible” for “establishing national immigration 
enforcement policies and priorities,” a mandate that expressly envisions the 
exercise of prosecutorial discretion.  6 U.S.C. § 202(5) (emphasis added).  In 
accordance with this mandate, Congress has afforded the Secretary broad authority 
to “establish such regulations; … issue such instructions; and perform such other 
acts as he deems necessary for carrying out his authority” under the immigration 
laws.  8 U.S.C. § 1103(a)(3) (emphasis added).  These broad grants of authority are 
of course subject to any specific statutory constraints, but as discussed below the 
plaintiffs have failed to identify any statutory provisions that the challenged 
executive actions violate.   
Congressional appropriations acts have, moreover, made clear that non-
enforcement is one of the acts the Secretary must take in setting immigration-
enforcement policies and priorities.  For decades, Congress has afforded the 
administration enough money to pursue only a small fraction of the undocumented 
population.  See Legomsky Testimony at 3.  Congress is well aware that there are 
about 11 million undocumented immigrants living in the United States, and that 
current appropriations enable the administration to pursue fewer than 400,000 of 
those immigrants per year, less than 4 percent of the full population.  Id.  
Congressional appropriations thus leave prosecutorial discretion unavoidable for 
the vast majority of violations.  Indeed, the appropriations acts do more than render 
      Case: 15-40238      Document: 00512994969     Page: 11     Date Filed: 04/06/2015
  5 
prosecutorial discretion unavoidable: they mandate a specific priority for the 
removal of criminal offenders and dictate sub-priorities that depend on the severity 
of the crime.  Id.  In light of the overwhelming and unmistakable constraints on full 
enforcement, Congress has left it to the Secretary to set other enforcement policies 
and priorities. 
Consistent with these congressional enactments, the Supreme Court has long 
recognized that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion plays a vital role in the 
immigration context.  Cf. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 
537, 543 (1950) (describing immigration as a “field where flexibility and the 
adaptation of the congressional policy to infinitely variable conditions constitute 
the essence of the program”).  As the Court recently explained in Arizona v. United 
States, “broad discretion exercised by immigration officials” is a “principal feature 
of the removal system.”  132 S. Ct. 2492, 2499 (2012).  This discretion extends to 
the decision “whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all.”  Id.  It also extends 
to “each stage” of the deportation process, such that at any point the Secretary “has 
discretion to abandon the endeavor … for humanitarian reasons or simply for [the 
agency’s] own convenience.”  Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 
U.S. 471, 483 (1999).  In Arizona, the Court outlined the wide array of 
considerations that guide immigration enforcement: 
Discretion in the enforcement of immigration law embraces 
immediate human concerns.  Unauthorized workers trying to support 
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their families, for example, likely pose less danger than alien 
smugglers or aliens who commit a serious crime.  The equities of an 
individual case may turn on many factors, including whether the alien 
has children born in the United States, long ties to the community, or 
a record of distinguished military service.  Some discretionary 
decisions involve policy choices that bear on this Nation’s 
international relations.  Returning an alien to his own country may be 
deemed inappropriate even where he has committed a removable 
offense or fails to meet the criteria for admission.  The foreign state 
may be mired in civil war, complicit in political persecution, or 
enduring conditions that create a real risk that the alien or his family 
will be harmed upon return.  The dynamic nature of relations with 
other countries requires the Executive Branch to ensure that 
enforcement policies are consistent with this Nation’s foreign policy 
with respect to these and other realities. 
132 S. Ct. at 2499.  Arizona struck down much of the state immigration statute at 
issue in the case precisely because it would have interfered with the Secretary’s 
broad discretion regarding immigration enforcement.  See id. at 2501-07. 
Agency discretion in enforcement, broad though it is, is not without limits.  
First, the agency’s actions must be “peculiarly within its expertise,” as defined by 
the relevant legislation.  Cf. Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831.  Second, the agency may not 
“disregard legislative direction in the statutory scheme that [it] administers,” and 
thereby infringe on congressional authority.  Id. at 833.  Third, the agency 
presumptively may not “‘consciously and expressly adopt[] a general policy’ that 
is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.”  Id. at 
833 n.4 (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159, 1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en 
banc)).  What amounts to a genuine “abdication” of statutory responsibilities will 
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depend on, among other things, the resource constraints confronting the agency: an 
agency’s failure to expend resources it does not have is fundamentally different 
from, for instance, a refusal to expend resources Congress has appropriated for 
enforcement.  See Legomsky Testimony at 15.  Finally, the agency’s decisions may 
not be arbitrary or capricious, see 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(a), or violate equal protection 
or individual constitutional rights.  As more fully elaborated below, the executive 
actions at issue here are well within these limits. 
II. Deferred Action, as Applied to Both Individual Noncitizens and Classes 
of Noncitizens, Is a Well Established Form of Enforcement Discretion 
that Has Been Recognized by Congress, Formal Agency Regulations, 
and the Courts   
A. The Nature of Deferred Action 
Deferred action is “an act of administrative convenience to the government 
which gives some cases lower priority.”  8 C.F.R. § 274a.12(c)(14).  It denotes “an 
exercise of administrative discretion in which immigration officials temporarily 
defer the removal of an alien unlawfully present in the United States.”  OLC Op. at 
12 (citing Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 484).  As the 
Secretary has explained, “[d]eferred action is a form of prosecutorial discretion by 
which the Secretary deprioritizes an individual’s case for humanitarian reasons, 
administrative convenience, or in the interest of the Department’s overall 
enforcement mission.”  Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary of 
Homeland Security, on Exercising Prosecutorial Discretion with Respect to 
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Individuals Who Came to the United States as Children and with Respect to 
Certain Individuals Who are the Parents of U.S. Citizens or Permanent Residents at 
2 (Nov. 20, 2014) (“DACA/DAPA Memo”).  This temporary decision “may be 
terminated at any time at the agency’s discretion.”  Id.  Further, it “confers no 
substantive right, immigration status or pathway to citizenship.”  Id. at 5.   
Once granted, deferred action triggers eligibility for two primary benefits 
apart from a temporary, revocable delay of removal proceedings.  Each of these 
benefits, like deferred action itself, “confers no lawful immigration status, [and] 
provides no path to lawful permanent residence or citizenship.”  OLC Op. at 21.   
The first benefit derives from the Secretary’s statutory power to prescribe 
which undocumented immigrants may obtain work authorization beyond those 
undocumented immigrants already expressly afforded such authorization by 
statute.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(3).  Congress has made clear that the Secretary’s 
authority to grant such authorization extends broadly, including to noncitizens in 
removal proceedings and even to noncitizens already subject to final orders of 
removal.  See id. § 1226(a)(3) (removal proceedings); id. § 1231(a)(7) (final orders 
of removal).  Pursuant to this statutory authority, the Secretary has granted work 
authorization to various classes of undocumented immigrants, such as applicants 
for asylum and applicants for cancellation of removal.  See generally 8 C.F.R. 
§ 274a.12(c); see also id. § 274a.12(c)(8) (asylum), (c)(10) (cancellation of 
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removal).  Among these classes are recipients of deferred action, so long as they 
can demonstrate an economic necessity for employment.  Id. § 274a.12(c)(14).   
A second benefit derives from the Secretary’s additional statutory power to 
grant aliens “unlawfully present in the United States” a “period of stay,” during 
which the alien will not accrue “unlawful presence” for purposes of certain 
admissibility rules.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (defining “unlawful presence” 
for purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(i) and (a)(9)(C)(i)(I) as the period after 
the expiration of the “period of stay” authorized by the Secretary).  This “period of 
stay” does not confer lawful immigration status, notwithstanding the district 
court’s repeated and unsupported statements that DACA and DAPA create an 
immigration “status.”  See, e.g., Dist. Ct. Op. at 59 n.45, 78, 87, 87 n.67, 95 & 
n.76, 112 (Dkt. No. 145).  Instead, it tolls the accrual of “unlawful presence,” a 
period of time defined as a legal term of art that is relevant to an alien’s eligibility 
for future admission.  The Secretary has authorized a period of stay for deferred-
action recipients, as well as for other classes of aliens lacking lawful immigration 
status, including certain aliens granted parole.  See 28 C.F.R. § 1100.35(b)(d) 
(deferred action recipients); 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(3) (U nonimmigrant status 
recipients granted period of stay if granted either deferred action or parole and also 
placed on a waiting list).  
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It is beyond dispute—and it is not disputed in this litigation—that the 
Secretary has authority to decide what categories of noncitizens are eligible for 
work authorization and when “unlawful presence” accrues.  As this Court has 
explained, the Secretary’s discretion is “unfettered” where, as here, the Secretary 
has been granted discretionary authority to grant relief by a statute that does not 
“restrict the considerations which may be relied upon.”  Perales v. Casillas, 903 
F.2d 1043, 1050 (5th Cir. 1990) (finding the Secretary’s decisions to grant work 
authorization had been “committed to agency discretion by law” and finding such 
decisions not subject to judicial review).  In any event, the executive actions 
challenged here did not change existing rules regarding either the availability of 
work authorization or the non-accrual of “unlawful presence” for purposes of the 
admissibility requirements identified above.  Instead, DAPA and the expansion of 
DACA increased the number of people who will receive deferred action, and thus 
the number of people who may be eligible for the benefits that have long been 
available to certain recipients of deferred action.  The legal criteria for those 
benefits and the legal effects of deferred action remain unchanged. 
B. The History of Deferred Action 
Deferred action has not only long been expressly recognized by the formal 
regulations described; it has also long been accepted—and, indeed, endorsed— by 
Congress and the courts.  Dating back to at least the 1970s, deferred action was 
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originally termed “non-priority status,” a reflection of the fact that it denotes a 
decision by the Secretary that the removal of certain noncitizens is not an 
enforcement priority.  See OLC Op. at 13.  While deferred action “developed 
without express statutory authorization,” for decades it has been a “regular 
practice.”  Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 484-85.  The 
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts have affirmed the practice as within 
the Secretary’s enforcement discretion.  See id. (noting that the Secretary has 
discretion to employ deferred action “for humanitarian reasons or simply for [the 
Secretary’s] own convenience”); Soon Bok Yoon v. INS, 538 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th 
Cir. 1976) (“The decision to grant or withhold nonpriority status [the prior term for 
deferred action] therefore lies within the particular discretion of the INS ….”); 
Pasquini v. Morris, 700 F.2d 658, 662 (11th Cir. 1983) (holding that deferred 
action is “firmly within the discretion of the INS”).  
Both deferred action and similar forms of discretionary relief from removal 
have been made available to large classes of noncitizens, not just to individual 
citizens on an ad hoc basis.  One common analog to deferred action is “extended 
voluntary departure,” a “discretionary suspension of deportation proceedings 
applicable to particular groups of aliens.”  Hotel & Rest. Emp. Union, Local 25 v. 
Attorney General, 804 F.2d 1256, 1261 (D.C. Cir. 1986), vacated on other 
grounds, 846 F.2d 1499 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (en banc).  Between 1956 and 1972, for 
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example, the INS granted extended voluntary departure to certain noncitizens from 
the Eastern Hemisphere who had filed satisfactory professional visa petitions but 
were nonetheless subject to deportation given limits on available visas.  See United 
States ex rel. Parco v. Morris, 426 F. Supp. 976, 979-80 (E.D. Pa. 1977).  Later in 
the 1970s, the INS granted extended voluntary departure to nurses eligible for H-1 
visas.  See Voluntary Departure for Out-of-Status Nonimmigrant H-1 Nurses, 43 
Fed. Reg. 2776-01, 2776 (Jan. 19, 1978).  Since 1956, moreover, there have been 
“more than two dozen instances” of INS grants of “parole, temporary protected 
status, deferred enforced departure, [and] extended voluntary departure to large 
numbers of nationals of designated foreign states.”  OLC Op. at 14.   
Of special relevance here, both the Reagan and Bush I administrations 
employed these forms of discretionary relief in order to defer removal of 
noncitizens who would be separated from lawfully present family members.  In 
1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 
(“IRCA”), Pub. L. No. 99-603, which granted lawful immigration status to roughly 
3 million people but consciously did not confer such status on their noncitizen 
family members who were not independently eligible for lawful status.  In 1987, 
the Reagan administration nonetheless adopted a “Family Fairness” initiative, 
granting reprieves from deportation to noncitizen children who were living with 
parents granted lawful immigration status under IRCA.  See Memorandum from 
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Gene McNary, Commissioner, INS to Regional Commissioners, INS, on Family 
Fairness: Guidelines for Voluntary Departure under 8 CFR 242.5 at 1 (Feb. 2 
1990) (“Family Fairness Memorandum”).  The Bush I administration expanded 
this policy, granting additional deportation reprieves, as well as work 
authorization, to the children and spouses of individuals who were granted lawful 
immigration status under IRCA.  Id. at 1-2; OLC Op. at 14.  At the time, the 
administration predicted that approximately 1.5 million children and spouses—
roughly 40 percent of the then 3.5 million undocumented immigrants in the United 
States—would be eligible for these benefits.  OLC Op. at 31; Immigration Policy 
Center, Reagan-Bush Family Fairness: A Chronological History (Dec. 9, 2014), 
http://www.immigrationpolicy.org/just-facts/reagan-bush-family-fairness-
chronological-history; see also Legomsky Testimony at 23-25 (refuting 
misinformation about the intended scope of IRCA and the size of the group eligible 
under the Family Fairness initiatives, and elaborating the parallels between these 
initiatives and DAPA and DACA).   
In recent years, the Secretary has granted discretionary relief to a number of 
classes of undocumented immigrants through deferred-action policies similar to 
those at issue here.  These classes have included (1) noncitizens who, following 
abuse by their lawfully present spouses, self-petitioned for lawful immigration 
status under the Violence Against Women Act of 1994; (2) applicants for certain 
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visas (known as “T” visas and “U” visas) under the Victims of Trafficking and 
Violence Protection Act of 2000; (3) foreign students unable to maintain the “full 
course of study” required for their student visas as a result of school closures 
following Hurricane Katrina; (4) widows and widowers of citizens whose visa 
applications had not been adjudicated at the time of their spouse’s death; and, (5) 
under DACA, which is not challenged in this lawsuit, certain noncitizens who had 
been brought to the United States as children.  OLC Op. at 15-18.  Each of these 
deferred action policies, like DAPA and expanded DACA, created specific criteria 
for eligibility but left room for the Secretary to exercise case-by-case discretion.  
See id.  As with any deferred-action policy, each of these policies triggered, under 
other laws and regulations, the benefits for deferred-action recipients summarized 
above: eligibility to apply for work authorization and temporary non-accrual of 
“unlawful presence” for purposes of certain admissibility rules.   
Congress, aware of these and other uses of deferred action, has “never acted 
to disapprove or limited the practice,” and it has never acted to stop deferred action 
from triggering either work authorization or temporary non-accrual of “unlawful 
presence.”  OLC Op. at 18.  Indeed, Congress has enacted legislation that assumes 
the availability of deferred action and, in fact, expressly extends the scope of 
deferred action.  Some of these enactments have ratified the existing classes of 
noncitizens that have been subjected to deferred action.  See Victims of Trafficking 
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and Violence Protection Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-386, § 1503(d)(2), (codified 
at 8 U.S.C. § 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (IV)) (endorsing deferred action and work 
authorization for self-petitioners under the Violence Against Women Act and 
expanding eligibility to include children under the age of 21); William Wilberforce 
Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L. 110-457, 
§ 204 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1227(d)(1), (2) (stating that the Secretary may grant 
an “administrative stay” of removal for T and U visa applicants, and that the denial 
of a request for an administrative stay shall not preclude an application for deferred 
action)).  Still other enactments have identified additional classes of individuals 
that Congress has stated should be eligible for deferred action.  See USA 
PATRIOT Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 423(b) (certain family members of 
lawful residents killed on September 11, 2001); National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, § 1703(c)-(d) (certain family 
members of citizens killed in combat).  Congress further affirmed deferred action 
in the REAL ID Act of 2005, which provided that certain state IDs are acceptable 
for federal purposes when their holders have deferred-action status.  Pub. L. 109-
13, div. B (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 30301 note). 
The courts, meanwhile, have consistently recognized that the Secretary may 
implement deferred-action policies based on general categorical criteria like those 
specified under DAPA and expanded DACA.  See, e.g., Am.-Arab Anti-
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Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. at 484-85 (quoting a treatise on immigration law 
that listed various “humanitarian reasons” in guiding when deferred action is 
appropriate); Pasquini, 700 F.2d at 661 (listing five general criteria officers 
considered in granting deferred action and finding that immigration officials had 
discretion to employ the criteria); Nicholas v. INS, 590 F.2d 802, 806-08 (9th Cir. 
1979) (same).  Absent such criteria, immigration officers would have little 
guidance as to how to exercise their discretion in a manner consistent with the 
Secretary’s “national immigration enforcement policies and priorities.”  See 6 
U.S.C. § 202(5).    
III. The Secretary Adopted DAPA and the Expansion of DACA Based Upon 
Considerations that Are Peculiarly within the Secretary’s Expertise  
DAPA and the expansion of DACA are the result of just the kind of 
“complicated balancing” that is “peculiarly within [the agency’s] expertise” and 
thus its discretion.  See Chaney, 470 U.S. at 831.  Three considerations are 
paramount: (1) the severe resource constraints confronting the Secretary’s 
immigration enforcement efforts; (2) humanitarian considerations that have long 
guided deferred-action policies and immigration policy more generally; and (3) the 
importance of consistency in the Secretary’s enforcement of the immigration laws. 
As explained above, the Secretary has extraordinarily scarce resources with 
which to pursue removal of the 11 million undocumented immigrants in the United 
States—enough to remove fewer than 400,000 of them, or less than 4 percent.  
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Even this estimate overstates the agency’s capacity for removal, given that its 
resources must also be used for border security and given that “non-Mexican 
nationals comprise an increasingly large percentage of unauthorized entries and 
require significantly more resources per removal.”  Legomsky Testimony at 15.  
Indeed, Congress has long funded enforcement far below the level that would be 
required for full enforcement.  Hiroshi Motomura, The President’s Discretion, 
Immigration Enforcement, and the Rule of Law 3 (2014), http://www.immigration
policy.org/sites/default/files/docs/the_presidents_discretion_immigration_enforce
ment_and_the_rule_of_law_final_1.pdf.  Immigration enforcement, therefore, is 
selective by necessity and this selectivity is clearly intended by Congress: the 
Secretary must prioritize the removal of some classes of people and accordingly 
deprioritize other classes.   
In setting these priorities in DAPA and expanded DACA, the Secretary 
exercised his discretion in a manner that expressly incorporates the priorities 
mandated by Congress.  The policy places the highest priority on people with 
significant criminal records and those who present dangers to national security, 
public safety, and border security.  People without such risk factors who are 
parents of lawful residents or who were brought to the United States as children 
rank among the lowest of congressional priorities.  DAPA and the expanded 
DACA prevent the expenditure of scarce agency resources on such low-priority 
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individuals so that the Secretary can best pursue high-priority targets.  By soliciting 
identifying information from applicants for deferred action, the policies also give 
the Secretary an inexpensive means of gathering such information about 
noncitizens who, while presently low-priority, might later commit acts that make 
them high-priority removal targets.  See Legomsky Testimony at 25. 
DAPA and expanded DACA also further congressional policies of keeping 
parents together with their lawfully present children and affording weight to strong 
family and community ties.  See INS v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214, 220 n. 9 (1966) 
(“The legislative history of the Immigration and Nationality Act clearly indicates 
that the Congress … was concerned with the problem of keeping families of 
United  States citizens and immigrants united.”); Arizona, 132 S. Ct. at 2499 
(noting that the “equities of an individual case” for immigration enforcement 
purposes turn on factors “including whether the alien has children born in the 
United States” or “long ties to the community”).  For instance, Congress has 
provided that the Secretary has discretion to afford lawful status to parents who 
have been continuously present in the country for at least ten years and whose 
removal would cause hardship to their U.S. citizen children.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229b(b)(1); see also id. § 1182(h)(1)(A) (allowing discretionary relief even for 
noncitizens who had committed certain crimes, so long as they occurred more than 
15 years previously).  It has provided that parents of U.S. citizens may obtain 
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family-based immigrant visas.  See id. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i).  Indeed, parents of 
lawful permanent residents also have a path to obtain such visas, albeit a lengthier 
one.  See id. §§ 1427(a) & 1430(a) (providing a path from legal permanent 
residence to U.S. citizenship, whereby eligibility generally accrues within three or 
five years).  The Secretary’s recent actions thus provide interim humanitarian relief 
for certain noncitizens to whom Congress has given a prospective entitlement to 
lawful immigration status, achievement of which takes considerable time.  DAPA 
and expanded DACA also draw on the same humanitarian concerns that have long 
animated deferred-action decisions, recognized and endorsed by Congress.  See 
Pasquini, 700 F.2d at 661 (noting five humanitarian criteria employed in such 
decisions: “(1) advanced or tender age; (2) many years presence in the United 
States; (3) physical or mental condition requiring care or treatment in the United 
States; (4) family situation in the United States -- affect [sic] of expulsion; (5) 
criminal, immoral or subversive activities or affiliations”). 
Finally, DAPA and expanded DACA promote consistency in the Secretary’s 
enforcement of the immigration laws.  Before the Secretary adopted DAPA and 
DACA, agency memoranda had directed immigration officials to employ similar 
enforcement priorities.  These priorities, however, have been applied haphazardly 
and ignored by field officers.  See Motomura, supra at 7 (describing the 
“enforcement rank-and-file’s” response to pre-DACA prosecutorial discretion 
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guidelines).  DAPA and expanded DACA ensure that the Secretary’s policies will 
be applied in a uniform, predictable, and non-discriminatory manner, while still 
leaving room for discretion based on the facts of individual cases.   
IV. DAPA and Expanded DACA Constitute Priority-Setting and the 
Exercise of Enforcement Discretion, Not Abdication of the Secretary’s 
Duty to Enforce the Immigration Laws 
The only specific provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act that the 
district court found to be violated by the administration’s actions is 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1225.  Dist. Ct. Op. at 96-98.  Under section 1225, “all aliens … who are 
applicants for admission … shall be inspected by immigration officers,” and, if the 
immigration officer determines that an alien who is an applicant for admission “is 
not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted, the alien shall be detained 
for a [removal] proceeding.”  8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(3), (b)(2)(A) (emphases added).  
The district court concluded that DAPA and expanded DACA violated this 
provision because, in that court’s view, “the word ‘shall’ is imperative” and the 
Secretary’s “duty of removing illegal aliens” cannot be made consistent with 
“giv[ing] them legal presence and work permits.”  Dist. Ct. Op. at 97. 
At the time of the district court’s decision, the argument that section 1225 
confers on the Secretary a duty of removing all undocumented immigrants had 
already been thoroughly discredited.  See David A. Martin, A Defense of 
Immigration-Enforcement Discretion: The Legal and Policy Flaws in Kris 
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Kobach’s Latest Crusade, 122 Yale L.J. Online 167 (Dec. 20, 2012), 
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/a-defense-of-immigration-enforcement-discretion-
the-legal-and-policy-flaws-in-kris-kobachs-latest-crusade.  As an initial matter, 
section 1225 does not even facially apply to almost half of the undocumented 
immigrants.  Id. at 171.  These immigrants do not fall into the section’s definition 
of an “applicant for admission” because they were legally admitted to the United 
States but overstayed their visas.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1225(a)(1) (defining “applicant 
for admission” as “an alien present in the United States who has not been admitted 
or who arrives in the United States”). 
Even as to the remaining group of undocumented immigrants, section 1225 
does not alter the Secretary’s discretion in immigration enforcement.  It is well 
established that use of the word “shall” in statutes governing law enforcement does 
not eliminate prosecutorial discretion absent some clear congressional statement to 
the contrary.  See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 760-61 
(2005) (holding that the use of the word “shall” to instruct police conduct in a 
criminal statute did not eliminate law enforcement discretion); United States v. 
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 693 (1974) (stating that the “Executive Branch has exclusive 
authority and absolute discretion to decide whether to prosecute a case”).  The 
Board of Immigration Appeals has applied this reasoning to uses of the word 
“shall” in parallel sections of section 1225 itself.  See Matter of E-R-M- & L-R-M-, 
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25 I & N. Dec. 520, 522 (BIA 2011) (“It is common for the term ‘shall’ to mean 
‘may’ when it relates to decisions made by the Executive Branch of the 
Government on whether to charge an individual and on what charge or charges to 
bring.”).   
The broader statutory scheme governing immigration law cannot be 
reconciled with reading section 1225 to eliminate the Secretary’s enforcement 
discretion.  Congress has expressly authorized immigration officials to use such 
discretion in deciding whether removal is appropriate.  As explained above, it has 
expressly endorsed deferred action in a variety of contexts.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1154(a)(1)(D)(i)(II), (IV) (self-petitioners under the Violence Against Women 
Act); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(d)(1), (2) (T and U visa applicants); USA PATRIOT Act of 
2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 423(b) (certain family members of 9/11 victims); 
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-136, 
§ 1703(c)-(d) (certain family members of citizens killed in combat).  Congress has 
also expressly afforded the Secretary discretion to grant parole to individuals 
otherwise subject to removal, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A), and it has granted  the 
Secretary authority to allow aliens to voluntarily depart the United States rather 
than enter removal proceedings, see id. § 1225(a)(4) (authorizing the Secretary to 
permit applicants for admissions to withdraw their applications and depart from the 
United States); id. § 1229c(a)(1) (authorizing the Secretary to grant voluntary 
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departure “in lieu of” removal proceedings).  Given the constraints of 
congressional appropriations, moreover, the Secretary does not have nearly enough 
resources to remove every “applicant for admission” suspected of being unlawfully 
present; an interpretation of section 1225 that eliminated all prosecutorial 
discretion would thus turn all immigration officials into lawbreakers for failing to 
expend resources the agency does not have. 
The district court’s analysis regarding section 1225 fails also because it 
assumes that the benefits that might flow from deferred-action—possible eligibility 
for work authorization and temporary non-accrual of “unlawful presence” for 
purposes of certain admissibility rules—are inconsistent with the fact that 
recipients of deferred action could be subject to removal.  See Dist. Ct. Op. at 97.  
As explained above, the Secretary has long had express statutory authority to 
confer these benefits on individuals who could be subject to removal.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1324a(h)(3) (stating that an “unauthorized alien” may be given work 
authorization by the Secretary); id. § 1182(a)(9)(B)(ii) (defining “unlawful 
presence,” a legal term of art relevant for future admission, such that the Secretary 
may toll it by authorizing a “period of stay”).  At any rate, section 1225 says 
nothing about the benefits that may be afforded to individuals who are subject to 
removal.  It speaks to when removal is appropriate, subject to the Secretary’s 
discretion.  
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The district court’s conclusory statements that the Secretary “abdicated” his 
statutory authorities are equally contrary to law.  The exercise of prosecutorial 
discretion as a matter of setting priorities, with stated reasons that are both within 
the expertise of the agency and not inconsistent with congressional direction, does 
not constitute an “abdication” of the agency’s “statutory responsibilities.”  Cf. 
Chaney, 470 U.S. at 833 n.4.  Such abdication is so rare as to be unheard of: “no 
court appears to have invalidated a policy of non-enforcement founded upon 
prosecutorial discretion on the grounds that the policy violated the Take Care 
Clause” by virtue of abdication.  Kate Manuel and Tom Garvey, Congressional 
Research Service, Prosecutorial Discretion in Immigration Enforcement at 17 
(Dec. 27, 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42924.pdf.    
Indeed, this Court has “reject[ed] out-of-hand” a contention parallel to the 
one at issue here—that the federal government’s “systemic failure to control 
immigration is so extreme as to constitute a reviewable abdication of duty.”  Texas 
v. United States, 106 F.3d 661, 667 (5th Cir. 1997).  This Court rejected the 
plaintiffs’ abdication argument in Texas because the plaintiffs had failed to show 
that the federal defendants in that case were “doing nothing to enforce the 
immigration laws,” or that they had “consciously decided to abdicate their 
enforcement responsibilities.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The same is true here.  
DAPA and the expansion of DACA reflect part of the Secretary’s conscious efforts 
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to enforce the immigration laws by focusing the agency’s scarce resources on its 
enforcement priorities.  The agency continues to spend all the resources Congress 
has allocated to it for enforcement, and it oversees an enforcement regime that is 
more effective—as indicated by fewer unauthorized entries and more removals—
than it was when this court “reject[ed] out-of-hand” the claim that the agency had 
abdicated its enforcement responsibilities.  Id.; Legomsky Testimony at 6; see also 
Barack Obama, Deporter-in-Chief, The Economist (Feb. 8, 2014), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21595902-expelling-record-numbers-
immigrants-costly-way-make-america-less-dynamic-barack-obama (“America is 
expelling illegal immigrants at nine times the rate of 20 years ago[,] nearly 2 
[million] so far under Barack Obama, easily outpacing any previous president.”)  
As this Court explained in Texas, “inadequate enforcement of immigration laws,” 
whether “real or perceived,” is not alone sufficient to show an abdication of the 
Secretary’s enforcement duties.  Texas, 106 F.3d at 667. 
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), does not cast any doubt on the 
import or proper application of Texas.  In Massachusetts, the Supreme Court held 
that the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) had failed to properly explain 
its decision not to regulate carbon dioxide emissions from motor vehicles.  The 
Court did not find that the EPA’s decision was beyond the scope of its discretion in 
enforcing the Clean Air Act.  Instead, it simply instructed the EPA that it could 
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avoid taking regulatory action with respect to the emissions only if it provided 
“some reasonable explanation” as to why it could not or would not “exercise its 
discretion” to do so.  Id. at 533.  Here, there is no doubt that the Secretary has 
provided a reasonable explanation for his decision to exercise his enforcement 
discretion as outlined in DAPA and the expanded DACA, which the Secretary 
grounded in both agency expertise and congressional immigration priorities.   
The district court’s conclusion that the Secretary had abdicated his statutory 
duties depended on that court’s erroneous assumption that deferred action 
“contradicts Congress’ statutory goals,” from which assumption the district court 
reasoned that deferral of removal amounts to “doing nothing to enforce the 
removal laws.”  Dist. Ct. Op. at 98-99 (citation omitted).  First, an agency that has 
spent every penny Congress has given it for immigration enforcement, and which 
has removed more than 2 million people through those efforts, can hardly be 
described as “doing nothing.”  Second, as explained above, this assumption ignores 
decades of congressional acceptance—and endorsement—of deferred action.  The 
district court also reasoned that the grant of DAPA and the expansion of DACA 
extends too broadly, to “a class of millions of individuals.”  Id. at 99.  This 
reasoning too cannot withstand scrutiny.  As set out above, the Secretary has 
granted deferred action and other comparable discretionary relief to numerous 
other large classes of individuals, and his authority to do so has been endorsed by 
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Congress and affirmed by the courts.  Moreover, the class potentially eligible for 
DAPA and expanded DACA is hardly unprecedented.  As noted earlier, an 
estimated 1.5 million undocumented immigrants, approximately 40 percent of the 
then undocumented population, were expected to be eligible for the Family 
Fairness initiative.  A roughly equal proportion of the current undocumented 
population is predicted to be potentially eligible for DAPA and expanded DACA.   
V. DAPA and Expanded DACA Establish an Enforcement Framework 
that Requires Individualized, Discretionary Decisions 
At least two aspects of DAPA and expanded DACA require that 
immigration officials engage in individualized assessments of particular 
applications for deferred action.  First, immigration officials must determine 
whether the individual seeking deferred action is “an enforcement priority” under 
the agency’s November 20, 2014 prioritization memorandum.  See DACA/DAPA 
Memo at 4; see also Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Secretary of 
Homeland Security, on Policies for the Apprehension, Detention and Removal of 
Undocumented Immigrants (Nov. 20, 2014) (“Prioritization Memo”).  This 
determination requires the exercise of individualized, discretionary judgments as 
to, for example, whether the person has “significantly abused the visa or visa 
waiver programs” and whether the person “pose[s] a danger to national security” 
or to “public safety.”  Prioritization Memo at 3-4.  Second, officials must assess 
whether the individual seeking deferred action presents “no other factors that, in 
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the exercise of discretion, make[] the grant of deferred action inappropriate.”  
DACA/DAPA Memo at 4. 
The application of threshold criteria that require individual judgments are 
just as discretionary and unreviewable as discretionary determinations made after 
all threshold criteria have been met.  See Gonzalez-Oropeza v. U.S. Attorney 
General, 321 F.3d 1331, 1332-33 (11th Cir. 2003) (finding discretionary and 
unreviewable determinations of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship,” a 
threshold requirement for cancellation of removal); Romero-Torrez v. Ashcroft, 
327 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2003) (same); see also Crowley Caribbean Transport, Inc. 
v. Peña, 37 F.3d 671, 677 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (stating that “the sort of mingled 
assessments of fact, policy, and law that drive an individual enforcement decision” 
are the type “that are, as Chaney recognizes, peculiarly within the agency’s 
expertise and discretion”).  A decision is no less discretionary by virtue of being 
made in the course of applying general agency guidelines, so long as the decision 
is individualized.  Cf. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 313 (1993) (holding that the 
use of “reasonable presumptions and generic rules” is consistent with 
individualized decisionmaking); Kenney v. Glickman, 96 F.3d 1118, 1123 (8th Cir. 
1996) (“Chaney applies to individual, case-by-case determinations of when to 
enforce existing regulations rather than permanent policies or standards.”). 
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There is not a shred of evidence to support the district court’s conclusion 
that the Secretary adopted these discretionary standards merely as a “pretext.”  
Dist. Ct. Op. at 109 n.101.  The district court apparently assumed that immigration 
officials, in implementing DAPA and the expansion of DACA, will ignore the 
Secretary’s “clear and repeated instructions to exercise discretion in each case.”  
Legomsky Testimony at 12.  It credited the bare, unsubstantiated assertion that 
prior DACA applications have been “rubberstamped” for approval.  See Dist. Ct. 
Op. at 11 (citing Decl. of Kenneth Palinkas ¶¶ 6, 8, 10 (Dkt. No. 64, Attach. 42)); 
see also Legomsky Testimony at 12.  This assertion is simply wrong.  Through 
2014, roughly 38,000 DACA applications—or five percent—have been denied on 
the merits.  See Decl. of Donald W. Neufeld ¶ 23 (Dkt. No. 130, Attach. 11) 
(“Neufeld Decl.”).  While a 95 percent approval rate may appear high at first blush, 
it hardly indicates that immigration officials have eschewed the exercise of 
discretion mandated by the Secretary—particularly given that undocumented 
individuals who are unlikely to meet DACA’s criteria will tend to avoid revealing 
their immigration status and identifying information by submitting an application.  
They will also be unlikely to invest $465 in an application likely to be denied.  See 
Legomsky Testimony at 12-13 & n.10.  The district court did not address this fact; 
instead, after reciting the 95 percent figure reported by the agency, it relied on a 
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witness’s unsupported (and incorrect) claim that the DACA approval rate was in 
fact 99.5 percent.  Compare Dist. Ct. Op. at 10 with id. at 109 n.101. 
There is likewise no evidence to support the district court’s conclusion that 
past DACA applications have never been denied based on “an exercise of 
individualized discretion.”  Dist. Ct. Op. at 109 n.101.  The district court reasoned 
that “the Government could not produce evidence concerning applicants who met 
the program’s criteria but were denied” and on this basis “accept[ed] the States’ 
evidence as correct.”  Dist. Ct. Op. at 11 n.8.  Yet, at the district court’s express 
request, the government had indeed submitted such evidence, explaining that 
DACA petitions have been denied to applicants who met the threshold DACA 
criteria but had submitted false statements in prior applications or had previously 
been removed.  Neufeld Decl. ¶ 18.  Meanwhile the state plaintiffs, which bore the 
burden of proof in their motion for a preliminary injunction, see Canal Auth. of 
Fla. v. Callaway, 489 F.2d 567, 573 (5th Cir. 1974), presented no evidence to the 
contrary beyond unsupported assertions.  Regardless, the agency does not exercise 
individualized discretion only after assessing whether DACA’s threshold criteria 
have been met.  As explained above, some threshold criteria themselves require the 
exercise of such discretion. 
Even if the state plaintiffs had been able to show that immigration officials 
have not exercised discretion on an individualized basis with respect to the 
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preexisting DACA policy (and, again, they were not), that would not warrant 
wholesale invalidation of policies that have not even begun yet.  See Janvey v. 
Alguire, 647 F.3d 585, 601 (5th Cir. 2011) (“The party seeking a preliminary 
injunction must … show that the threatened harm is more than mere speculation.”).  
If, contrary to their past practices under DACA, immigration officials 
systematically disobey the Secretary’s requirements that they exercise 
individualized discretion under DAPA and the expanded DACA, some remedy 
might be warranted.  Shutting down the policies before they have begun, based on 
speculation that the Secretary’s subordinates will not follow the policies, 
systematically disobeying the Secretary’s explicit instructions, defies both logic 
and the limits of the judicial power. 
CONCLUSION 
The district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction should be reversed. 
       Respectfully submitted, 
 
          /s/ Bradley S. Phillips   
      Bradley S. Phillips 
      John F. Muller 
MUNGER, TOLLES & OLSON LLP 
355 South Grand Avenue, 35th Floor 
Los Angeles, CA 90071 
(213) 683-9100 
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APPENDIX 
List of Amici Curiae∗ 
David Abraham 
Professor of Law 
University of Miami School of Law 
 
Muneer I. Ahmad 
Clinical Professor of Law 
Yale Law School 
 
Raquel Aldana 
Professor of Law 
University of the Pacific McGeorge School of Law 
 
Farrin R. Anello 
Visiting Assistant Clinical Professor 
Seton Hall University School of Law 
 
Roxana Bacon 
Visiting/Adjunct/Lecturer Professor of Immigration Law 
University of Miami 
Syracuse University 
University of Arizona 
Arizona State University 
 
David C. Baluarte 
Assistant Clinical Professor of Law 
Director, Immigrant Rights Clinic 
Washington and Lee University School of Law  
 
Janet Beck 
Clinical Assistant Professor 
University of Houston Law Center  
                                           
∗ Law school affiliations are provided for informational purposes only and do not indicate any 
endorsement by the law school or university of the views of the professor. 
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Richard A. Boswell 
Professor of Law & Associate Dean for Global Programs 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law 
 
Jason A. Cade 
Assistant Professor of Law 
University of Georgia Law School 
 
Janet M. Calvo 
Professor of Law   
CUNY School of Law 
 
Kristina M. Campbell 
Associate Professor of Law 
Director, Immigration and Human Rights Clinic 
University of the District of Columbia David A. Clarke School of Law 
 
Bridgette Carr 
Clinical Professor of Law 
University of Michigan Law School 
 
Benjamin Casper 
Visiting Associate Clinical Professor 
University of Minnesota Law School 
Center for New Americans 
 
Jennifer Chacón 
Professor of Law 
University of California, Irvine School of Law 
 
Howard F. Chang 
Earle Hepburn Professor of Law  
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
 
Violeta R. Chapin 
Associate Clinical Professor of Law 
University of Colorado Law School 
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Ming H. Chen 
Associate Professor 
University of Colorado Law School 
 
Gabriel J. Chin 
Professor of Law 
University of California, Davis School of Law 
 
Michael J. Churgin 
Raybourne Thompson Centennial Professor in Law 
University of Texas at Austin 
 
Dree K. Collopy 
Lecturer and Co-Director 
Immigration Litigation Clinic 
The Catholic University of America  
Columbus School of Law 
 
Ingrid Eagly 
Assistant Professor of Law 
UCLA School of Law 
 
Philip A. Eichorn 
Professor of Immigration Law 
Cleveland State University School of Law 
 
Stella Burch Elias 
Associate Professor of Law 
University of Iowa College of Law 
 
Jill E. Family 
Professor of Law 
Director, Law & Government Institute 
Widener University School of Law 
 
Niels Frenzen 
Clinical Professor of Law 
Gould School of Law 
University of Southern California 
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Maryellen Fullerton 
Professor of Law 
Brooklyn Law School 
 
Lauren Gilbert 
Professor of Law 
St. Thomas University School of Law 
 
Jennifer Gordon 
Professor of Law 
Fordham Law School  
 
John F. Gossart, Jr. 
Adjunct Professor of Law 
University of Baltimore School of Law & 
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law 
United States Immigration Judge (retired) 
 
Lisa Graybill 
Lecturer and Director, Immigrants’ Rights Lab 
University of Denver Sturm College of Law 
 
Pratheepan Gulasekaram 
Associate Professor 
Santa Clara University School of Law 
 
Anju Gupta 
Associate Professor of Law 
Director, Immigrant Rights Clinic 
Rutgers School of Law - Newark 
 
Jonathan Hafetz 
Associate Professor of Law 
Seton Hall University  
 
Lindsay M. Harris 
Clinical Teaching Fellow & Supervising Attorney  
Center for Applied Legal Studies  
Georgetown University Law Center 
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Susan Hazeldean 
Associate Clinical Professor of Law 
Cornell Law School 
 
Geoffrey Heeren 
Associate Professor of Law 
Valparaiso University Law School 
 
Laura A. Hernández 
Professor of Law 
Baylor Law School 
 
Michael Heyman 
Professor Emeritus 
The John Marshall Law School 
 
Laila L. Hlass 
Clinical Associate Professor 
Boston University School of Law 
 
Mary Holper 
Associate Clinical Professor 
Boston College Law School 
 
David M. Hudson 
Professor of Law 
Levin College of Law 
University of Florida 
 
Alan Hyde 
Distinguished Professor and Sidney Reitman Scholar 
Rutgers University School of Law - Newark 
 
Kit Johnson 
Associate Professor of Law 
University of Oklahoma College of Law 
 
Anil Kalhan 
Associate Professor of Law 
Drexel University Thomas R. Kline School of Law 
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Harvey Kaplan 
Professor Emeritus 
Northeastern University School of Law 
 
Elizabeth Keyes 
Assistant Professor 
University of Baltimore School of Law 
 
Andrew Tae-Hyun Kim 
Assistant Professor of Law 
Syracuse University College of Law 
 
Jennifer Lee Koh 
Associate Professor of Law and Director, Immigration Clinic 
Western State College of Law 
 
Charles H. Kuck 
Adjunct Professor of Law 
Emory University School of Law 
 
Hiroko Kusuda 
Associate Clinic Professor 
Loyola New Orleans College of Law  
Stuart H. Smith Law Clinic & Center for Social Justice 
 
Kevin Lapp 
Associate Professor of Law 
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles 
 
Christopher N. Lasch 
Associate Professor of Law 
University of Denver Sturm College of Law 
 
Stephen Lee 
Professor of Law 
University of California, Irvine 
 
Steven H. Legomsky 
The John S. Lehmann University Professor 
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Washington University School of Law 
 
Christine Lin 
Clinical Instructor / Staff Attorney 
Refugee & Human Rights Clinic 
Center for Gender & Refugee Studies 
University of California, Hastings College of the Law 
 
Lynn Marcus 
Co-Director, Immigration Law Clinic 
University of Arizona Rogers College of Law 
 
Peter L. Markowitz 
Associate Clinical Professor of Law 
Kathryn O. Greenberg Immigration Justice Clinic 
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law 
 
Miriam H. Marton 
Director, Tulsa Immigrant Resource Network 
Visiting Assistant Clinical Professor of Law 
University of Tulsa College of Law 
 
Elizabeth McCormick 
Associate Clinical Professor of Law 
University of Tulsa College of Law 
 
M. Isabel Medina 
Ferris Family Distinguished Professor of Law  
Loyola University New Orleans College of Law 
 
Andrew F. Moore 
Associate Professor of Law 
University of Detroit Mercy School of Law 
 
Jennifer Moore 
Professor of Law 
Weihofen Professorship 
University of New Mexico School of Law 
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Daniel I. Morales 
Assistant Professor of Law 
DePaul University College of Law 
 
Hiroshi Motomura 
Susan Westerberg Prager Professor of Law  
School of Law 
University of California, Los Angeles 
 
Rev. Craig B. Mousin 
Adjunct Faculty 
DePaul University College of Law 
 
Karen Musalo 
Bank of America Foundation Chair in International Law 
Professor & Director, Center for Gender & Refugee Studies  
University of California, Hastings College of the Law 
 
Alizabeth Newman 
Clinical Law Professor 
CUNY School of Law 
 
Mariela Olivares 
Associate Professor of Law 
Howard University School of Law 
 
Michael A. Olivas 
William B. Bates Distinguished Chair in Law  
University of Houston Law Center 
 
Sarah Paoletti 
Practice Professor of Law 
Director, Transnational Legal Clinic 
University of Pennsylvania Law School 
 
Michele R. Pistone 
Professor of Law 
Villanova University School of Law 
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Luis F.B. Plascencia 
Assistant Professor 
School of Social and Behavioral Sciences 
Arizona State University 
 
Nina Rabin 
Associate Clinical Professor of Law 
James E. Rogers College of Law, University of Arizona 
 
Jaya Ramji-Nogales 
Professor of Law 
Co-Director, Institute for International Law and Public Policy 
Temple University, Beasley School of Law 
 
Jayesh Rathod 
Associate Professor of Law 
Director, Immigrant Justice Clinic 
American University Washington College of Law  
 
Renee C. Redman 
Adjunct Professor of Law 
University of Connecticut School of Law 
 
Jane G. Rocamora 
Senior Attorney/Clinical Supervisor 
Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinic of  
Greater Boston Legal Services, Inc. and Harvard Law School 
 
Rachel E. Rosenbloom 
Associate Professor of Law 
Northeastern University School of Law 
 
Marty Rosenbluth 
Clinical Practitioner in Residence 
Elon University School of Law 
 
Galya Ruffer 
Director, Center for Forced Migration Studies  
Buffet Institute for Global Studies 
Northwestern University 
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Rubén G. Rumbaut 
Distinguished Professor of Sociology, Criminology, Law and Society 
University of California, Irvine 
 
Emily Ryo 
Assistant Professor of Law and Sociology 
University of Southern California 
Gould School of Law 
 
Leticia Saucedo 
Professor of Law  
University of California, Davis School of Law 
 
Heather Scavone 
Assistant Professor of Law 
Director of the Humanitarian Immigration Law Clinic 
Elon University School of Law 
 
Andrew I. Schoenholtz 
Professor from Practice  
Director, Human Rights Institute 
Director, Center for Applied Legal Studies 
Georgetown Law 
 
Philip G. Schrag 
Delaney Family Professor of Public Interest Law 
Georgetown University Law Center 
 
Barbara Schwartz 
Clinical Professor of Law 
University of Iowa College of Law 
 
Ragini Shah 
Clinical Professor of Law 
Suffolk University Law School 
 
Sarah Sherman-Stokes 
Clinical Teaching Fellow 
Boston University School of Law 
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Bryn Siegel 
Professor, Immigration Law 
Pacific Coast University School of Law 
 
Dan R. Smulian 
Associate Professor of Clinical Law 
Co-Director, Safe Harbor Project 
BLS Legal Services 
Brooklyn Law School  
 
Jayashri Srikantiah 
Professor of Law 
Director, Immigrants' Rights Clinic 
Stanford Law School 
 
Juliet Stumpf 
Professor of Law 
Lewis & Clark Law School  
 
Margaret H. Taylor 
Professor of Law 
Wake Forest University School of Law 
 
David Thronson 
Associate Dean for Academic Affairs and Professor of Law 
Michigan State University College of Law 
 
Scott Titshaw 
Associate Professor of Law 
Mercer University School of Law 
 
Philip L. Torrey 
Lecturer on Law 
Clinical Instructor, Harvard Immigration and Refugee Clinical Program 
Supervising Attorney, Harvard Immigration Project 
Harvard Law School 
 
Diane Uchimiya 
Professor of Law 
Director of Experiential Learning 
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Director of the Justice and Immigration Clinic 
University of La Verne College of Law  
 
Sheila I. Vélez Martínez 
Assistant Clinical Professor of Law 
Immigration Law Clinic 
University of Pittsburgh School of Law 
 
Rose Cuison Villazor 
Professor of Law  
University of California, Davis School of Law 
 
Leti Volpp 
Robert D. and Leslie Kay Raven Professor of Law 
Berkeley Law 
 
Olsi Vrapi 
Adjunct Professor of Law 
University of New Mexico School of Law 
 
Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia 
Samuel Weiss Faculty Scholar 
Clinical Professor and Director 
Center for Immigrants' Rights 
Penn State Law 
 
Jonathan Weinberg 
Professor of Law 
Wayne State University 
 
Deborah M. Weissman 
Reef C. Ivey II Distinguished Professor of Law  
School of Law 
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
 
Virgil O. Wiebe 
Professor of Law 
Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi Director of Clinical Education 
Co-Director, Interprofessional Center for Counseling and Legal Services 
University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis 
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William O. Douglas Clinical Professor of Law 
Deputy Dean for Experiential Education 
Yale Law School 
 
Lauris Wren 
Clinical Professor 
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University 
 
Stephen Yale-Loehr 
Adjunct Professor 
Cornell University Law School 
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